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There are many faces of Asians in London, which include: skilled 
Indian middle class migrants from the 1960s who have settled 
into a comfortable life in the capital; working class Bangladeshi 
Muslims from Sylhet in East London who have managed curry 
houses on Brick Lane; Punjabi immigrants who have settled 
and created ‘Little India’ in Southall, Hounslow, and Harrow; 
and radicalisation of British-born Pakistanis who carried out 
the London bombings in July 2005. To examine the disparate 
communities that are all reduced to the term ‘British Asian’, and 
to focus particularly on the diversity of British-born (‘second-
generation’) Asians, the LSE Annual Fund sponsored a one-day 
workshop entitled ‘Second-generation British-Asian Experiences 
in London: diversity, conflict and cohesion’. The roundtable, held 
at LSE on 29 May 2012, brought together key policymakers and 
researchers to discuss the inter-relationships between concepts of 
cohesion, integration, social mobility, and equality as they pertain 
to British-born Asians in London.
The event also provided an opportunity for policymakers and 
researchers from think-tanks, academia, and government to 
start a constructive dialogue about these vital issues, which 
are crucial to British-born Asians and all other Londoners. The 
roundtable consisted of three sessions: a presentation of a pilot 
study examining the Hindu Bengali community in Tower Hamlets 
(see Case Study); a summary of policies from the Greater London 
Authority and Harrow relevant to British-born Asians; and a 
wrap-up session to summarise the proceedings. Participants at 
the workshop framed their discussions on key questions that 
organisers sent beforehand. As with the roundtable itself, this 
report does not aim to provide resolutions to questions about 
integration, but rather to inform, evoke, and provoke in order to 
stimulate further discussions about the topic.  The subsequent 
sections will summarise the main discussions during the workshop, 
sub-divided by the aforementioned key questions.  
Case Study:  
Hindu Bengalis in 
Tower Hamlets
In the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 
the Council and academicians have 
carried out extensive research on British-
born Muslim Bengalis, since Bangladeshis 
comprise approximately 40% of the local 
population. This research has found that 
British-born Muslim Bengalis in the borough 
show low levels of cohesion, social mobility, 
and integration. Anecdotally, the Hindu 
Bengali minority in Tower Hamlets shows 
relatively high levels of social mobility. This 
is particularly interesting because Hindu 
Bengalis in the borough come from the 
same ethno-linguistic group, migrated at 
approximately the same time, have the same 
socio-economic origins, emigrated from the 
same region in Bangladesh (Sylhet), and 
settled in the same places (social housing 
in East London). To explore the case study 
further, the researchers focused on one of 
the Hindu Bengali community organisations 
in Tower Hamlets, Hindu Pragati Sangha 
(HPS), which built a Hindu temple in Mile 
End. The other Hindu Bengali community 
organisation in the borough is Sanaton 
Association.
Working with second-generation members 
of HPS, the research team designed 
and administered a questionnaire for a 
small pilot study (n=20) about cohesion, 
integration, and social mobility. These 
results were complemented by narrative 
data from a small informal focus group. 
The respondents were between 20 and 40 
years of age. In the survey, cohesion was 
defined using the national indicators on 
neighbourhood cohesion (NI1 and NI2), 
but adapting the wording to also gauge 
levels of cohesion at school, work, and in 
the UK. Integration was defined with more 
social connotations, with questions on the 
ethnicity of the respondent’s closest friends 
and long-term partner. Social mobility was 
measured by finding the respondent’s 
education level and income, compared with 
narrative data about his or her parents.
The researchers confirmed the high 
levels of social mobility in the pilot study. 
Although the first-generation had largely 
come without professional qualifications 
and took up ‘blue collar’ jobs in East 
London, most of the respondents worked 
in ‘white collar’ professions in the City or 
as medical doctors, with 55% earning 
£20,000-£40000 per year and 25% 
having an annual salary exceeding £40000. 
Although most respondents completed 
state education, 90% of the respondents 
had obtained university degrees (35% 
of whom completed a postgraduate 
qualification). Respondents also exhibited 
high levels of cohesion (i.e. feelings of 
belonging) in school, work, and in the UK, 
with slightly lower levels for the local area. 
In the focus group, the second-generation 
HPS community said that feelings of 
exclusion came from the majority Muslim 
Bengalis in the local area, not the White 
British population. Although respondents 
displayed high levels of self-identification 
as ‘British’ relative to other options, 
other indicators suggest that the second-
generation Hindu Bengalis were not socially 
integrated. Of the respondents, 80% had 
some or many of their closest friends from 
within the Hindu Bengali community. 
Of those who had long-term partners, 
only one respondent married outside 
the community, though British-born 
Hindu Bengalis did marry others UK-born 
members of the community. The results 
suggest that Hindu Bengalis in Tower 
Hamlets have high levels of social mobility 
and cohesion, with low levels of social 
integration. This challenges the prevailing 
policy consensus that sees ‘integration’ as 
a catalyst for cohesion and social mobility, 
since British-born Hindu Bengalis in 
Tower Hamlets exhibit cohesion without 
integration. Further research will seek to 
unpack this puzzle.
The research will develop in four different 
ways. First, the sample of Hindu Bengalis 
will be extended to other British-born 
Hindu Bengalis in HPS and the Sanaton 
Association. Second, the same analysis 
will be applied to British-born Muslim 
Bengalis in Tower Hamlets. Third, the 
patterns of social mobility, cohesion, and 
integration amongst children of working 
class Hindu Bengalis in Tower Hamlets will 
be compared with those of British-born 
Hindu Bengalis in the Bengali Cultural 
Association (BCA) in Newham, whose 
parents are predominantly highly-skilled 
middle class migrants from West Bengal. 
Finally, the results of these analyses will 
be compared with the Hindu Bengali 
communities in Manchester, to see 
whether there is a ‘London effect’ in 
patterns of integration, cohesion, and 
social mobility.
From pardesi to desi?: Cohesion, integration, 
and social mobility amongst British-born Asians
Is it possible to fit general principles 
from Government and Mayor’s Office 
integration policies to local needs?
At the Council level, individuals or groups 
of individuals access services in inequitable 
ways, so it is vital for the Council to intervene 
to ensure fairer access across the local 
population. In other words, the Council aims 
to promote ‘equal life chances for all’ in the 
borough, as espoused by the Mayor’s Office.  
This type of thinking is already reflected in 
procedures at the Council level. For example, 
the Harrow Council does not schedule 
meetings around midday on Fridays, since 
it would restrict access to Muslims (due 
to Friday prayers) and those who work in 
full-time jobs. UK Government and London 
policies on integration have tried to find 
‘universal’ principles that are still flexible 
enough to cater to local needs. One concern 
with the existing policies is that the evidence-
based approach requires empirical data, and 
there is a danger that marginalised groups 
that are not detected may remain invisible 
from integration policies.
In order to implement the policies 
effectively, it is important to look at 
the local political context within which 
Councils are implementing integration 
and cohesion policies, and whether 
British-Asians are integrated in decision-
making. Most Councils outside London are 
dominated by White British middle-aged 
males. The experience is rather different 
in London. Two-thirds of current Tower 
‘Many first-generation 
even second-generation 
Bangladeshis maintained this 
view of “going back”… It was 
all about getting employment, 
sending money back, with 
the aim that they were going 
to return to Bangladesh… I 
would argue, if they [Hindu 
Bengalis] knew whether they 
were not going back…they 
made a conscious decision 
that they were going to strive 
to be educated, strive to get 
into professions, and the 
Muslim Bengalis in the area 
think that they were always 
going to go back’.
Hamlets councillors are of Muslim Bengali 
(Bangladeshi) origin, and many of them are 
British-born and in their 20s or early 30s. 
The HPS Hindu Bengalis in Tower Hamlets 
reported that although they had all suffered 
some racism at the hands of local white 
working class residents, it is the interaction 
with local Muslim Bengalis that they find 
most antagonistic. In particular, respondents 
reported that their access to Council services 
has been more difficult compared to their 
Muslim Bengali counterparts. The high level 
of Muslim Bengali political engagement is 
perhaps a legacy of high levels of political 
activism amongst first-generation migrants. 
Compared to other boroughs in East 
London, the British-born Muslim Bengali 
population in Tower Hamlets is politically 
engaged, and many are active from a young 
age in youth parliaments and other similar 
activities. This may be due to the reliance of 
working class Muslim Bengalis on council 
services. For middle-class residents, Council 
services may seem distant, but for Muslim 
Bengalis in Tower Hamlets, the Council 
is a crucial part of their access to health, 
housing, education, and employment. On 
the one hand, this has meant that Muslim 
Bengalis are integrated into politics of the 
borough, but this has also created new 
types of exclusion for groups that are not 
Muslim Bengali.
In Harrow, British Indians have a major 
presence on the Council, though there are 
few non-Indian Asians. However, workshop 
participants inquired whether this provided 
evidence of significant integration into 
political decision-making, since it might 
be possible to become a Councillor as a 
British-Asian, yet the cabinet portfolios 
remain in the hands of ‘native’ White 
British politicians. In the case of Harrow, 
the previous head of the Council, who 
is now a member of the Greater London 
Authority, is of Indian descent. In the past 
few years, two of the portfolio holders in 
Harrow Council have been Indian women. 
The Councillors have generally been older 
and born outside the UK, unlike in Tower 
Hamlets. Despite the presence of elected 
officials on local Councils in London, there 
is a demographic gap between the ‘top 
table’ decision-makers in the local statutory 
bodies and the rest of the staff, where the 
upper echelons do not reflect the diversity 
of the borough population or the Council 
personnel. This is an important observation 
for the pilot study on Hindu Bengalis 
in Tower Hamlets. Most respondents 
registered high levels of cohesion in their 
workplace. However, they are mainly at an 
early stage of their careers in private sector 
firms. It would be interesting to revisit the 
same sample in 5-10 years’ time to see 
whether they have progressed within their 
firms to decision-making positions, and 
whether this promotion (or lack thereof) 
will affect their attitudes on cohesion and 
integration. It would also be interesting 
to follow the life trajectories by gender, 
and whether female respondents started 
families and were expected to stay at home 
at the expense of career advancement.          
Before examining factors that may explain 
the differences amongst British-born Asians 
in London, it is instructive to highlight the 
commonalities of the British Asian experience. 
Though British Asian communities may be 
integrated into the workforce per se, they 
nonetheless find that there is an earnings 
‘glass ceiling’. One roundtable attendee said 
that research has found that – including 
high prestige professions such as medical 
doctors – the most successful individuals 
of Asian descent will still earn 25% less on 
average than their White British counterparts. 
The picture is bleaker for those looking 
for employment, even for those with 
qualifications. The UK Department for Work 
and Pensions published a report, A test for 
racial discrimination in recruitment practice 
in British cities, where it sent identical CVs 
with ‘British’ and ‘foreign-sounding’ names 
and found that 74% more applications from 
ethnic minority candidates were needed to 
achieve the same level of success as white 
candidates. Thus, across the board, British-
born Asians face difficulties in achieving full 
integration into the labour force (regardless 
of other demographic characteristics).
The first generation of Asian migrants in the 
1960s and 1970s experienced more virulent 
and occasionally violent racism, and different 
communities galvanised activism around the 
umbrella term of ‘Asian’ during the anti-racism 
movement, not as a cultural designation, but 
as an empowering political coalition to stand 
up to organisations like the National Front. 
The anti-racism movement in places like Tower 
Hamlets by Left-orientated Muslim Bengalis 
represent the genesis of the integration and 
cohesion policy agenda, and local political 
activism more generally. British Muslims and 
Sikhs were the main drivers of the movement, 
whilst British Hindus were less visible.
These features of the anti-racism movement 
perhaps explain one of the more intriguing 
findings of the Hindu Bengali pilot study. 
Choosing between the terms ‘Asian’, 
‘Bengali’, ‘British’, ‘Hindu’, and ‘Indian’ for 
self-identification, respondents felt least 
affinity for the term ‘Asian’, since they 
found it to have negative connotations – 
particularly in mass media. Since British 
Hindus were less active during the anti-racism 
movement, there is no strong political history 
of conflict with the state, and there is no 
political cultural barrier to working for the 
Establishment, such as large banks in the City 
run predominantly by white managers. A 
second reason for avoiding the term ‘Asian’ is 
perhaps to distinguish themselves from other 
British Asians, particularly Muslim Bengalis, 
in Tower Hamlets. This is a function of two 
factors. First, Tower Hamlets, and many 
other parts of London, have large British 
Asian populations, so there is a sufficient 
critical mass to express more nuanced British 
Asian identities by ethno-linguistic group 
or religion. These opportunities would not 
present themselves in other parts of Britain, 
so this highlights another crucial part of the 
British Asian experience: destination of the 
first generation migrant. Whether the first 
generation settled in Tower Hamlets near  
the City or a post-industrial city such as 
Sheffield strongly conditions the experiences 
and ‘life chances’ available to second- and 
third-generation.
A second factor is that, compared to their 
parents, British-born Asians do not have 
a language barrier and thus have the 
confidence to integrate into the UK. In other 
words, the ‘defensive’ identity of ‘Asian’ is 
replaced by more ‘proactive’ assertions of 
integration and nuanced ethno-linguistic 
or religious identities. Asian communities 
that have been in the UK longer have 
integrated more effectively than newer 
migrants. For example, Indian and Pakistani 
migrants have been in Harrow for several 
decades, and are more well-integrated than 
recent migrants from Sri Lanka and from 
Afghanistan.  Thus, the second factor that 
differentiates experience is the generation 
of the British Asian. However, determining 
inter-generational patterns is complicated by 
British-born Asians marrying partners from 
the country of origin. Although the British-
born Hindu Bengalis in Tower Hamlets tend 
to find spouses amongst the community born 
in the UK, a significant number of British-
born Muslim Bengalis in Tower Hamlets 
marry partners born in Bangladesh, which 
blurs the generational boundary. Bangladeshi 
women who come over to the UK, even 
with educational qualifications, tend stay at 
home in a carer role for elderly in-laws and 
‘As the newer arrived Asian 
community became more 
established, became more 
confident, and were able to 
think about the things that 
were important to them, 
you had the emergence of 
temples, gurdwaras and 
mosques. It’s a part of 
becoming more established and 
feeling confident in terms of 
expressing their faith’.
‘If you look at some of the 
similarities in terms of 
integration within society as 
a whole, interactions within 
society as a whole, actually 
you will probably find that 
white working class people 
actually probably have more 
in common with working 
class people from Asian 
communities’.
Is there an overarching ‘British-Asian’  
experience in London?
‘The interesting thing is that 
even working in this area, I 
am still struggling to identify 
what Britishness is, when 
one has achieved integration. 
Maybe it is just the journey, 
maybe the road is shifting, as 
society is not standing still, 
maybe it’s just the journey’.
find it difficult to obtain the know-how to 
integrate into the labour force. Bangladeshi 
men who join their British-born wives in the 
UK have slightly better levels of success than 
British-born Bangladeshis, but there is a real 
problem across this community translating 
qualifications into employment. A counter-
intuitive inter-generational pattern is that the 
older generation, even from traditional and 
rural backgrounds, may have been involved in 
the anti-racism movement, joined the Labour 
party, and had social circles across different 
Asian communities, whilst the subsequent 
generation has sought to pursue a more 
orthodox and narrow identity, such as the 
increase in British-born Muslim men growing 
beards and British-born women wearing 
the niqab. Thus, it is the older generation 
that were embedded in inclusive progressive 
politics in the UK, whilst their children may be 
more ‘traditional’.
However, describing the fragmentation 
of second-, third-, and fourth-generation 
identities needs to be balanced with 
cultural forms that seek to bring together 
disparate British Asian voices. There are 
parallels between these processes and the 
construction of a politicised Black British 
identity in the 1980s and 1990s. The Dis-
orienting Rhythms collection on Asian urban 
music showed that there was a shared notion 
of an identity that drew on the Homeland 
and the UK. In this context, the term British-
Asian has been replaced by the word desi, 
which translates as ‘local’ in Hindi, though 
it refers to a transnational identity of those 
from the Subcontinent not born in the 
‘Homeland’ – and has replaced the term 
pardesi (‘foreigner’). However, there are also 
complex constructions about those who 
can be desi, and who cannot, and the term 
has been co-opted mainly by those of North 
Indian origin, and those outside London. 
Those within London, for the reasons 
outlined above, tend to prefer narrower  
self-identification.
A third factor that affects the trajectory of the 
second-generation are the socio-economic 
characteristics of the first generation. Thus, 
highly-skilled Asian migrants from urban 
areas are expected to integrate more quickly 
into education, housing, and employment 
compared to their low-skilled counterparts. It 
is here that the Hindu Bengali pilot study also 
provides an interesting finding. Although the 
parents of the group of respondents in the 
study come from the same ethno-linguistic 
group, same region, same socio-economic 
origin, and settled in the same places as Muslim 
Bengalis in London, Hindu Bengali respondents 
showed high levels of cohesion and social 
mobility, compared to the majority Muslim 
Bengali population. This suggests that either 
the Hindu Bengali migrants were perhaps more 
well-off than their Muslim counterparts, or 
there is another missing factor.
Most of the participants felt that a fourth 
factor, the aspiration to return, may explain 
some of these differences. In the Muslim 
Bengali community in East London, the first 
generation wanted to return to the homeland, 
and would speak about eventually returning 
to Bangladesh or would send money home. 
Thus, this community was less likely to 
actively integrate with education, housing, 
and employment in the UK, since they always 
felt that life in the UK was temporary – even 
though they have not since returned to 
Bangladesh. By contrast, Hindu Bengalis 
left, sometimes as persecuted minorities in a 
Muslim-majority country, to establish a new 
life in the UK. Thus, there is no ‘homeland’ 
to go back to, so it is best to integrate here 
in the UK. Interestingly, the pilot study found 
that they associate with India, not Bangladesh. 
Moreover, in the self-identification question in 
the survey, more respondents placed ‘British’ 
as their primary identity, just ahead of ‘Indian’. 
Thus, there is a little or no identification with 
being Bangladeshi.                 
There are strong partisan patterns in the understanding of both 
integration and multiculturalism. Under Ken Livingstone from the 
Labour Party,   the Mayor’s Office identified specific communities 
and specific organisations within those communities to be targeted 
when developing policies in areas such as employment, health and 
housing. The new Conservative Mayor, Boris Johnson, by contrast, 
saw the previous Mayor’s multicultural policies as divisive and not 
bringing Londoners together. The Mayor’s Equality Framework, Equal 
Life Chances for All, has shifted to an evidence-based approach that 
is mainstreamed across all policy areas to identify those who do not 
have equal ‘life chances’. The policies of the UK Government also 
show a break from a focus on multiculturalism or integration in 
favour of an evidence-based approach that seeks to improve inter-
generational social mobility. The UK Coalition Government’s strategy 
– Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers – examines individual ‘life cycles’ 
during foundation, school, and transition years, as well as adulthood, 
in order to identify important points in which to intervene. Unlike 
previous Government policy, the ‘life cycles’ approach is not a ‘top-
down’ policy, but rather a long-term strategy that requires action 
from all sectors in society. For example, because of the proximity to 
Can notions of multiculturalism and integration co-exist in 
building a cohesive society?
‘When you are talking about 
employment gaps in the 
Muslims, when you actually 
look at it by breaking down the 
Indian Muslim community, 
and the employment rate for 
them, it’s probably different 
from the Pakistani Muslim 
community, and from 
the Bangladeshi Muslim 
community. When policy is 
being developed…there’s a need 
to actually break it down. If we 
are going to address the barriers 
of inequalities, you need to 
actually go to that level’.
‘What I am hearing is that maybe we in local 
government need to seize the initiative and take 
on this view of mainstreaming... For a long 
time, and we’ve definitely done this, we’ve taken 
what the Government has done as the latest 
mantra on policy. Maybe our challenge now is 
to say…we need to create this space locally to be 
a bit more responsive to what’s different’.
‘We have had this completely mad idea that  
we can somehow, through public services, 
manage people out of structural poverty.  
And that’s crazy’.
Tower Hamlets in East London, larger private firms in the City have 
carried out initiatives as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility 
Programmes in local schools to help the disadvantaged.
In the Fabian Society’s 2010 pamphlet Separate and Unequal, Nick 
Johnson proposes a way to move beyond the gap between notions of 
‘integration’ and ‘multiculturalism’ in order to build a diverse society 
whilst reducing inequality, using an approach that celebrates both 
commonality and diversity in order to reduce inequality. Participants 
in the roundtable also identified this relationship between the two 
concepts, with a mutual respect for differences (‘multiculturalism’) as 
a basis for starting a process in order to find a set of common goals 
and values (‘integration’). Part of the challenge faced during the 
roundtable is that the term ‘integration’ has different connotations in 
different settings. In the case study on Hindu Bengalis, ‘integration’ 
refers to a more cultural definition, measured through interactions 
with members outside the community. By contrast, governmental 
policy definitions underline that ‘integration’ initiatives should create 
conditions such that all members of the community are able to fully 
take part in the society, with a particular focus on issues such as 
health, housing, and employment. Participants in the roundtable 
did refer to both understandings of ‘integration’, but there was a 
consensus that the definition of equal access for all was of more use.  
As outlined above, both central government and the London Mayor’s 
office have moved away from the strand-by-strand approach espoused 
by the Labour Party in favour of a more decentralized style. At the 
Council level, the new Government approach has signalled a new way 
of doing business, which some participants felt may be beneficial in the 
long-run. Despite the demographic differences amongst Councils, one 
borough official said that frameworks on equality at the local level tend 
to look very similar, suggesting that it is possible to distil commonalities 
which hold across London and across the UK. The prevailing London 
and Government policies also provide a discretionary space for local 
authorities to reflect on local context instead of waiting for policy 
frameworks from Whitehall. On the other hand, participants active at 
the local level voiced concerns that the focus on individual ‘life cycles’ 
and ‘life chances’ provides a way for the state policy to link directly to 
the individual citizen, which thus bypasses local authorities. They also 
said that by tailoring policies at the individual level, analyses ignore 
structural factors leading to inequalities, and there is an underlying 
assumption that the ‘right policies’ can solve deeper structural 
problems. Moreover, the evidence-based approach encouraged by 
the Mayor’s Office and the Government is vulnerable to blind-spots, 
whereby some smaller communities may be overlooked in studies, 
such as British-born Hindu Bengalis in Tower Hamlets analysed in in the 
aforementioned pilot study.
The roundtable participants focused on three further discussions 
related to integration and multiculturalism: defining Britishness; the 
exception of London; and  the relationship between integration and 
notions of cohesion. Workshop discussions on trying to define the 
end-point of integration of British-Asians interrogated the receding 
nature of the ‘Britishness’. There is a growing uneasiness amongst 
many British residents about what this actually means. There is 
a reliance on notions of Western or European liberal norms as a 
consensus on ‘British culture’ becomes more elusive. The Government 
requires applicants for long-term settlement or naturalization to pass a 
‘Life in Britain’ test, which may reflect a white majority view of the UK, 
according to one of the officials at the roundtable. A few participants 
claimed that the exam does not encourage diversity and inclusion, but 
rather promotes assimilation into a particular version of Britishness. 
However, other workshop delegates believed that the exam was a way 
to instil civic values and empowerment to access services, thus starting 
the process of integration. 
Nonetheless, attempts to promote certain types of ‘Britishness’ are 
confounded by the diversity within London, where a significant 
proportion of the population are ethnic minorities.  The notion of a 
mono-cultural and mono-racial ‘British host society’ does not reflect 
the realities in London, and the demographic settlement patterns in 
the rest of Britain are quite different from the diversity in the capital. 
That being said, it was mentioned that within the ‘global’ city of 
London, groups are segregated by class, ethnicity, and religion, 
only feeling certain parts of the capital are ‘their own London’. One 
suggested alternative to both ‘British’ and ‘London’ identities was a 
greater focus on a local civic identity to promote a stronger feeling of 
belonging in one’s own physical locality instead of more abstract city-
wide or national identification. 
After the 2001 riots in Oldham and Burnley between British Muslims 
and British White populations, the Labour Government reaffirmed the 
need for policies that emphasise cohesion and integration in order to 
foster greater inclusion. Local policymakers present at the workshop 
said that they try to promote integration through interaction 
and communication leading to a mutual respect for difference, 
though there are no operational definitions for ‘integration’ or 
Although most of the discussions focused 
on ethno-linguistic or religious distinctions 
within the British Asian community, 
participants in the roundtable agreed that 
socio-economic class remains a primary 
driver for integration, cohesion and social 
mobility for all communities in the UK. 
Socio-economic status affects an individual’s 
education, income, and health. According 
to the Waltham Forest Health Inequalities 
Strategy 2010-2015, traveling eastward 
on the Central Line between middle class 
Notting Hill Gate and working class Leyton, 
life expectancy reduces by a half a year for 
surrounding communities for each stop, and 
the male/female life expectancy in Notting 
Hill is 84.3/88.9 years compared to 76.5/81.2 
years in Leyton.
It was mentioned that the move away 
from ‘old style multiculturalism’ or ‘identity 
politics’ began during the previous Labour 
Government, as indicated in John Denham’s 
speech in 2010 as Communities Minister 
which emphasised that anti-discrimination 
policies should ‘target class, not race’. There 
was a concern that the Labour opposition 
is now shying away from mentioning race 
as part of the inequality debate. However, 
inequality is not a question of race or 
class, but rather the inter-play of different 
demographic factors, such as race, class,  
and gender.
Some of the participants also expressed a 
level of scepticism of Government policies 
on equality and integration, saying that they 
are not meant to transform society but rather 
maintain the status quo. Part of the critique 
stems from their feeling that the policies 
of this Government as well as the previous 
administration seek to incite change through 
gentrification. In other words, the policy 
by middle class decision makers becomes 
‘how to make the working class more like 
us’ through cultural outreach and similar 
projects, without tackling the structural 
causes of the widening socio-economic 
gaps in the city. As mentioned above, 
ascriptive traits like gender and ethnicity 
still affect social mobility and integration in 
employment, even for the most successful 
British Asians. There are British-born Asians 
who have been successful in climbing the 
corporate ladder, but they have tended to 
come from public schools and followed 
similar life trajectories to their privileged 
White British counterparts. Thus, marginalised 
British Asian communities remain so, and 
the experience of exclusion has more 
commonalities with the White working class 
communities in London, rather than more 
socio-economically advantaged members of 
their ethnic group. Thus, it is important to 
appreciate the ‘diversity of diversity’ within 
the British Asian communities by not focusing 
on ‘Asians’ in London as a uniform entity, 
and instead, being aware of possible patterns 
of exclusion by ethno-linguistic group, 
religion, class, gender, or generation. 
Still, participants in the workshop noted 
that the relationship between levels of social 
capital and level of poverty is not always the 
same. Areas with high levels of deprivation 
sometimes show high levels of community 
belonging, whereas the expectation would be 
the opposite. As an example, during the unrest 
during the summer of 2011, there were riots 
in several parts of London, but there were no 
riots in other deprived areas in the country like 
the East of Glasgow. This leaves a puzzle to 
explain more complex explanations for levels 
of community cohesion as they related to 
deprivation and demographics.
‘I think about this notion of 
“host society”, I think that 
in itself can be problematic, 
because the understanding 
is that the host society, 
particularly if we think about 
London or we think about the 
UK, narrowly being mono-
cultural or mono-racial is 
certainly not the case’.
How do socio-economic class 
differences amongst British-born 
Asians in London affect cohesion, 
integration, and social capital?
‘If you look where people 
settled, places like Bradford 
and Oldham, those places 
were poorly industrialised. 
The issue may well not be 
about places where they came 
from, but the conditions of 
what was available to them 
rather than the region from 
which they may or may not 
have migrated from’.
‘multiculturalism’. It is here that it is necessary to have more 
productive discussions between academia and policymakers, since, as 
mentioned above, definitions of these terms are complex and unclear, 
yet need to be grounded in policy outcomes to be useful.  The pilot 
study on Hindu Bengalis in Tower Hamlets suggests an interesting 
counter-narrative to prevailing ideas of links between integration 
(measured through inter-communication) and cohesion: although 
respondents showed a high level of social cohesion, they also were 
not integrated as evidenced by their predominantly intra-group 
social interaction. Thus, instead of using integration as a starting 
point (i.e. personal communication between members of different 
communities), it is perhaps a culmination of a longer process, starting 
with a reduction of poverty (leading to equality), resulting in more 
self-confidence to belong within a diverse patchwork of communities 
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The discussions during the roundtable resulted in areas of common 
understandings of cohesion, integration, and social mobility 
amongst British-born Asians in London, but it also posed new 
difficult questions that were not resolved during the workshop. The 
event provided a forum for policymakers, researchers from think-
tanks, and academicians to openly discuss complex issues related to 
British-born Asians in London in a deliberative space, instead of the 
isolation of one’s institutional context. In this way, the roundtable 
allowed for participants to challenge and be challenged by other 
interested stakeholders around understandings of key issues, and will 
hopefully represent the beginning of a constructive dialogue between 
policymakers and researchers on this topic.        
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‘The problem with that [evidence-based 
approach] is if you don’t have the evidence, 
you won’t make any improvements for 
communities that are always marginalised, 
so it’s a Catch-22. So they may remain 
marginalised for years to come, and there 
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